Tag: Equality Act 2010

FWS v Scottish Ministers: what to read before the hearing

The hearing next week before the Supreme Court of For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers is a big deal.

Previous cases in the appellate courts have had serious implications for the impact of gender reassignment on women’s rights. Three in particular spring to mind: Croft v Royal Mail Group (2003), in which the Court of Appeal speculates inconclusively about what degree of surgical or medical “transition” ought to be required before a man should be allowed to use women’s facilities in the workplace; Goodwin v UK (2002), in which the European Court of Human Rights laid the foundations for the Gender Recognition Act 2004; and Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v A (2005), in which members of the House of Lords came up with the eye-popping notion of a transsexual who was “visually and for all practical purposes indistinguishable” from a member of the opposite sex, and opined that it would be unreasonable for detainees to be unwilling to be searched by “a trans person of the same sex” (ie a person of the opposite sex).

All three cases have something striking in common: there was no-one in court whose job was to represent the interests of women, and women’s rights were in each case casually swept aside. This appears with particular starkness at ¶91 of the judgment of the ECtHR in Goodwin:



No concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the public interest has indeed been demonstrated as likely to flow from any change to the status of transsexuals and, as regards other possible consequences, the Court considers that society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost.

The alert reader will notice who in particular is meant here by the “society” that is expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience: women. The reader both alert and well-informed will understand by now that “inconvenience” has turned out to stand for things like being gaslit, tricked, shamed or coerced into sharing communal showers or changing rooms with any man who says he is a woman; being required to submit to a strip-search conducted by such a man; being tricked into submitting to intimate medical procedures at the hands of such men; or being imprisoned with male sex offenders.

Against this background, FWS v Scottish Ministers makes a refreshing change. The appeal is brought by a feminist organisation with the express purpose of defending women’s rights. For the first time, an appellate court considering these issues will be required to treat women as human beings with agency and rights of their own, and will be asked to give women’s rights and interests their full weight. It’s going to be a novel experience.

The written arguments of the parties and the intervenors have now all (with the exception of Amnesty UK’s intervention) been published. The arguments themselves make for pretty dry and technical reading, but we also have the benefit of analysis from various commentators. The purpose of this post is not to add to that, but to collect together a list of links for anyone interested in the issues. I’ll try to keep this page updated with any further commentary that becomes available (or comes to my attention) between now and the end of the hearing — so if there’s anything I’ve missed, please let me know in comments.

First, the written arguments of the parties and intervenors can be found here:  UK Supreme Court – For Women Scotland. They are also published with a collection of further links by Tribunal Tweets, who will be live-tweeting the hearing: For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers (Respondent) – UK Supreme Court 

Academics and practitioners

Dr Claire Methven O’Brien 

The Equality Act 2010 and support services for rape survivors: Does the UK comply with its international human rights obligations? 

Dr Michael Foran  

UK Supreme Court to decide “What is a woman?”: A detailed look at the arguments

What is a woman? The Scottish Government’s case 

Can the meaning of “sex” in the Equality Act vary depending on context? 

On Defining Sex in Law by Michael P. Foran

Naomi Cunningham 

Sex, peanuts and statutory interpretation –

Discrimination law and the experimental method – 

Scott Wortley

Michael's piece is outstanding (as are the written submissions from Ben Cooper and David Welsh for Sex Matters). The interpretation arguments based on deeming provisions (which create legal fictions), the narrow effect of deeming provisions, purposive interpretation,

— Scott Wortley (@scottwortley.bsky.social) 2024-11-19T20:51:03.317Z

Organisations

Murray Blackburn Mackenzie

For Women Scotland vs the Scottish Ministers: making the arguments transparent – Murray Blackburn Mackenzie

Briefing note: For Women Scotland vs the Scottish Ministers, UK Supreme Court, 26-27 November 2024 – Murray Blackburn Mackenzie

Sex Matters

Sex Matters’ intervention to the Supreme Court 

What about the other side? 

We have appealed on Twitter for analysis arguing that the Scottish Government should win. We haven’t heard of much, but there are these links: 

FWS Supreme Court case. 1. The “problem” FWS and others have with the current law is that it makes discrimination against trans people too hard. Preventing discrimination was the point of the legislation. In theory, therefore, this should be a very short case in which they are told where to go.

— A Mere Solicitor (@ameresolicitor.bsky.social) 2024-11-22T18:33:35.561Z

Courage, mes braves!There is, amongst trans people and allies, a certain amount of understandable nervousness about the U.K. Supreme Court hearing next week in the ‘For Women Scotland’ case.I don’t share that nervousness.

— Robin Moira White (@robinmoirawhite.bsky.social) 2024-11-22T18:04:27.483Z

https://bsky.app/profile/concerned-person.bsky.social/post/3lbkkq7mbf22g

Defining ‘sex’ in the Equality Act

Discrimination law and the experimental method

I want to apply yesterday’s dazzling insight that peanuts have to be left out of peanut-free meals to the words of the Equality Act and the specific question before the Supreme Court in For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers, to be heard later this month. This is another fairly short point, though a little more technical than yesterday’s. 

Broadly, the job of the EqA is to prohibit discrimination because of the various protected characteristics. But there are exceptions, so that it remains lawful for director of a play to insist that Juliet is played by a girl and Romeo by a boy, or for a charity to define its beneficiaries by reference to race, national origin or sexual orientation. 

Paragraphs 26 and 27 of schedule 3 make it lawful to provide separate-sex services, and single-sex services, in situations engaging considerations like bodily privacy and dignity. They are expressed in general terms: what’s permitted is providing “single-sex” services or “separate services for persons of each sex”. Obviously that means excluding persons of the other sex. And the exclusion can only be a blanket rule, or the service can’t truthfully be described as separate or single-sex, just as you can’t describe a meal as “peanut free” if you sometimes put peanuts in it. 

That much is straightforward, or ought to be. (There is in fact plenty of dissent to it out there, some of it undeniably heavyweight. Nevertheless, I think the law is clear.)

The question for the Supreme Court in FWS is whether the protected characteristic of sex in the EqA — whether someone is regarded as a man or a woman — is affected by section 9(1) of the GRA, so that a man with a gender recognition certificate declaring him to be a woman counts as a woman for the purposes of discrimination law. In other words, whether “sex” in the EqA just means sex; or whether it means sex except for people with GRCs, in which case it means the sex they are deemed to be because of their GRI. We can call these two possibilities “sex” and “certificated sex” for short. 

The answer to this question determines what kind of discrimination a man with a GRC declaring him to be a woman is subjected to if he is excluded from a women-only service. 

The law has developed a thought experiment, complete with imaginary “experimental control”, as the way of finding out whether someone has suffered discrimination for a particular reason. You don’t have to be a scientist to use experimental controls: we all do it pretty intuitively. 

Suppose your desk lamp isn’t working. Is it the bulb? Is the socket it’s plugged into live? Is it the fuse in the plug? Is the switch in the “on” position? You  find out which is the culprit by trying different things one by one. You change the bulb, keeping everything else the same. Does it light? If so, the problem was the bulb. If not, you put the old bulb back, and try the switch in the other position. Still no light? Switch the switch back, and plug the lamp into a socket you know is live. 

Similarly, if Chris is refused entry to the women’s changing room on account of his obviously male appearance, is that because of his sex? The common sense answer is “yes”. But a GRC transcends (or confounds) common sense: if it operates in the context of the EqA, what matters is Chris’s certificated sex, not his actualy sex, so it tells us that Chris is a woman. To find out whether Chris has been excluded because of his sex, we have to compare him with someone who is of the opposite sex, and ask whether that person would have been excluded, too. 

So, obedient to the pretence required of us by Chris’s GRC, we set to work constructing a comparator. We say “Chris is a woman, so a person of the opposite sex is a man, let’s call him Christopher. This is a women-only space, so Christopher would have been excluded just like Chris. So Chris wasn’t excluded because of his (deemed female) sex, because a person of the opposite sex would also have been excluded.” (In truth, the chances are no-one will ever do anything to Chris because of his “female” sex, because it’s almost certainly obvious that he’s a bloke.)

If we run the same thought experiment on the different PC of gender reassignment, we get a different answer. The law tells us that Chris is a woman (even while our senses tell us different). Chris is a woman with the PC of gender reassignment: although legally a woman, he is a woman not by physiology, but by legal deeming. Obviously a woman without the PC of gender reassignment — that is, an actual female woman — would not have been excluded. So we have our answer: the reason Chris has been excluded is because of his PC of gender reassignment, not his sex. 

That means that excluding Chris can’t be justified under ¶26 or 27 of schedule 3, because those operate to permit sex discrimiation. But it may still be lawful to exclude Chris, because ¶28 of schedule 3 provides that it’s not unlawful to discriminate on grounds of gender reassignment in relation to the provision of single or separate-sex services, provided “the conduct in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”. 

Remember, all this reasoning is proceeding on the assumption that that a GRC changes Chris’s sex for the purposes of the EqA. The weird thing about ¶28, on this assumption, is that it seems to say you have to work out whether the thing you did — excluding Chris — was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. But it’s always going to be — because, well, peanuts. If the space or service is single-sex, you can’t let a man in (even a man with a certificate), or in every sense that matters it’s no longer a single-sex space. A legal fiction can deem a man married to another man to be in a heterosexual marriage, or deem him to be female for pension purposes, etc, but  it doesn’t actually change the reality or the real consequences of a male body (or even the real consequences of the theoretical possibility of a male body). It won’t affect the trauma reaction of the already-traumatised female user of that space, or the justifiable outrage and affront of the non-traumatised woman who looks up when taking her knickers off to meet the eye of a man in a space she was told was for women only. The fact that the man in question has a secret certificate at home in a drawer won’t — even if somehow she knows about it — make her feel any less embarrassed, angry or alarmed. 

So ¶28 seems to call for  “case by case” decision-making in a situation in which only a blanket rule will do. I explored the practical impossibility of that here: https://www.legalfeminist.org.uk/2022/02/16/admission-to-women-only-spaces-and-case-by-case-assessment/. 

There are a lot of reasons why the Supreme Court should find for FWS, and this is only a relatively small one. But I think it’s pleasingly neat. 

The reason I say that is that the “certificated sex” assumption leads you into this weird, artificial, counter-factual reasoning about when you can and can’t exclude Chris — and you end up apparently having to make a case-by-case assessment of something that can only be satisfactorily dealt with by way of a general rule, precisely because the “single-sexness” of the space is about what you tell the female users of the space, and whether they can trust you. It’s not really about Chris and his individual characteristics at all. 

But as soon as you remove the GRA spanner from the works of the EqA, this bit of the machine starts running smoothly and rationally. 

On that assumption — that s.9(1) of the GRA doesn’t affect the EqA — this bit of the law can recognise Chris as the man he looks like, and is. He’s excluded because of his sex, which for these purposes remains male. And that’s lawful under ¶26 or 27 if it’s lawful to run a single-sex space at all. 

So what’s ¶28 for, on this hypothesis? Good question! I’m glad you asked it, because the answer is elegant and satisfying. The point of ¶28 is to make it lawful, where appropriate, to exclude not men, but some women from the space, because of their PC of gender reassignment. 

Mostly, women who say they are men (“trans men”) will be perfectly welcome in women-only spaces. That’s because they are women, with female bodies. Their presence won’t affront, humiliate or alarm anyone, and they are likely to have the same needs as any other woman. 

But some “trans men” have taken extreme steps to look like men. Women who do this can often do it quite successfully, for precisely the same reason that men who say they are women almost always remain very visibly male. The reason is testosterone. Testosterone is a powerful drug, and a one-way ticket. A man who has gone through male puberty will almost never be able to disguise its effects successfully in later life. But when a woman takes testosterone, she’s likely to acquire a much more male-looking physique, a broken male-sounding voice, facial hair and male-pattern baldness. So some women with the PC of gender reassignment really do look and sound pretty much like men, and there will be circumstances in which it is genuinely necessary to exclude them from women-only spaces for the sake of the other women in them. 

Obviously, this is a fact-sensitive judgement which will depend on the particular nature of the space or service, who else is likely to be using it, how it is organised, and how convincingly masculine is the appearance of the trans-identifying woman in question. In other words, it calls for precisely the kind of “case by case” decision-making that ¶28 seems to envisage. The difference is that on this hypothesis — that “sex” in the EqA simply means “sex” —“case by case” makes perfect sense.

Sex, peanuts and statutory interpretation

There’s an aspect of the FWS case (For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers) due to be heard later this month in the Supreme Court that is so childishly simple that one worries that the cleverest judges in the land may be too clever for it. This isn’t  about the legal arguments that the Court will have to grapple with. It won’t win the case: dry, technical arguments about statutory interpretation are what will determine the outcome. But statutory interpretation should be done on a foundation of reality and logic. 

The point is this. Single-sex spaces for women can’t have men in them, because if they do, they’re not single-sex. 

I told you it was simple. It’s like the “no peanuts” rule for a peanut-free dish. If you label a dish “peanut free”, you have to leave the peanuts out. All of them. The fact that lots of people like peanuts is no answer. Peanut-free dishes aren’t about those people: they’re about the people who may go into anaphylactic shock and die if they eat a peanut. It doesn’t matter if the peanut has been mashed to a paste, moulded into the shape of a walnut and scented with walnut oil, so that no-one looking at it, smelling it or eating it would dream that it might be a peanut. It doesn’t matter if it’s got a special certificate that says that for legal purposes it’s a walnut. It still needs to be left out of the peanut-free dish, or the peanut-free dish ain’t peanut-free. 

I have reason for my worry. It may be a simple point, but it’s one that the House of Lords managed to miss in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v A [2005] 1 AC 51. This is a pre-GRA case, so of tangential relevance at best to what the Supreme Court has to decide later this month, but it’s a troubling precedent all the same.  Lord Bingham said: 

In my opinion, effect can be given to the clear thrust of Community law only by reading “the same sex” in section 54(9) of the 1984 Act, and “woman”, “man” and “men” in sections 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the 1975 Act, as referring to the acquired gender of a postoperative transsexual who is visually and for all practical purposes indistinguishable from non-transsexual members of that gender. No one of that gender searched by such a person could reasonably object to the search. 

This is essentially the “case by case” approach to deciding whether or not a particular man should be permitted to use women’s facilities. It still has proponents. “Oh, but surely this particular man — this man who has wished with all his heart that he was female since early childhood, who has “lived as” a woman for decades now, who has had all the hormonal, surgical and cosmetic  treatment money can buy to look as much like a woman as possible — surely no-one would be so heartless as to exclude him?”  

This is coming at the problem from the wrong angle. It’s not about the man who wants to be treated as a woman or his wants or needs: it’s about the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the sign on the door that says “women only”. Because the female users of that space need to be able to be sure that there will be no men there: not even men who look very like women. Especially not men who look very like women. 

Think about that for a moment, this idea of a man who is “visually and for all practical purposes indistinguishable” from a woman. Lots of women have suffered male violence, and some of those are permanently traumatised to the point that if they are surprised by a man in a supposedly female-only space, they will be retraumatised. These women may need domestic violence shelters and rape crisis services at certain times, but they don’t engage with the world solely as rape or domestic violence survivors. They have ordinary lives, too. They use public toilets, hospitals, gyms; they visit pubs, galleries, cafés, museums, theatres. They don’t wear a special badge or uniform so that we can identify them and make sure we cater for their needs. We don’t know who they are. 

Obviously it’s not acceptable to say to such women “You can’t have any single-sex spaces”. But is it better to say  “You can have single-sex spaces, mostly.  Don’t worry: we’ll only let men use them if they look so much like women that you won’t be able to tell that they’re men.” 

Think about that. Think about its power to undermine the certainty of an already traumatised woman that the woman she is dealing with at any given moment is truly a woman. If you’re not shocked by the sadistic, gas-lighting cruelty of that, you’re not doing the thinking bit right. Think harder. Think about it until you are shocked.

Bailey v Stonewall

The decision is out in Allison Bailey’s appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal that Stonewall did not contravene s.111 Equality Act 2010. The Employment Appeal Tribunal has upheld the decision. 

The ET is the first instance tribunal. The EAT is the appellate tribunal which heard the appeal from the ET. Any onward appeal must go to the Court of Appeal – and can only be heard if permission is granted and if it satisfies the “second appeal test” of establishing an important principle or there is some other good reason for it to be heard. 

Allison Bailey was a barrister at Garden Court Chambers. A seasoned campaigner for lesbian and gay rights, she found herself in profound disagreement with the proposition then being advanced by Stonewall that some men were ‘truly’ lesbians, including those who had no intention of making a physical transition, if they said that they were. 

Both Ms Bailey and Stonewall made known their own views on this topic on Twitter. As a result of Ms Bailey’s tweets, Stonewall’s then Head of Trans Inclusion Kirrin Medcalf sent a complaint to Garden Court Chambers saying that “for Garden Court Chambers to continue associating with [Ms Bailey] puts us in a difficult position with yourselves” and that Stonewall trusted Garden Court “would do what is right and stand in solidarity with trans people.” 

The detriments to which Garden Court Chambers then subjected Ms Bailey on the basis of her protected belief are set out in the ET decision and were found proved by the ET, which found that Garden Court had unlawfully discriminated against her, including by upholding Medcalf’s complaint against her. However, the ET did not find that Stonewall, through Kirrin Medcalf, had “induced” or “caused” that discrimination. 

She appealed to the EAT. 

Section 111 Equality Act 2010 prohibits anyone from instructing, causing or inducing another to discrimination against another:

111 Instructing, causing or inducing contraventions
(1) A person (A) must not instruct another (B) to do in relation to a third person (C) anything which contravenes Part 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 or section 108(1) or (2) or 112(1) (a basic contravention).

(2) A person (A) must not cause another (B) to do in relation to a third person (C) anything which is a basic contravention.

(3) A person (A) must not induce another (B) to do in relation to a third person (C) anything which is a basic contravention.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), inducement may be direct or indirect.

… 

The EAT had to consider what these meant, which is not something previously attempted by a court. Bourne J held that 

  1. In section 111(1), “It is in the nature of an instruction that the instructor intends the instructee to do something specific. Person A need not be aware that the instructed act will be unlawful, but they must know what it is that they are instructing person B to do, and that act, as instructed, must contain all the elements of whichever of the statutory torts that person B will commit by following the instruction.” [101]
  2. the word “induce” in section 111(3) “is broadly synonymous with “persuade”. In one case it could consist of pure verbal persuasion, and in another it could involve an element of carrot or stick.” [105]  He also held that “it is in the nature of an inducement that the inducer intends the inducee to do what they are being induced to do.” [106] and so “inducing” in s.111(3) must be intentional. 

In other words, both instruction and inducement are intentional by their very nature. 

That left s.111(2) and “cause.” To this the judge applied a two-stage test: first, was the discrimination ‘caused’ by the defendant, applying a “but for” test – would it have happened but for the actions of the defendant? Then secondly, is it “fair, just and reasonable” to hold them liable? 

This came from a House of Lords authority, Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19. This is a case which has provided significant authority in respect of the tort of conversion, litigation privilege and the iniquity exception, but it seems that this is the first time it has been cited in respect of discrimination. It has been cited in another EAT case, also decided by Bourne J, but in respect of litigation privilege rather than discrimination. 

The EAT held in this case that “by analogy with the approach to loss in Kuwait Airways, a claimant must show first that person A’s conduct causally contributed to person B’s commission of the prohibited act on a “but for” basis and, second, that the causal connection is such that person A ought to be held liable. Borrowing Lord Nicholls’ phrase, those last words mean that, having regard to the statutory context and to all the facts of each case, making person A liable would be “fair or reasonable or just”, those adjectives being interchangeable.” 

It went on to hold that “For that reason, although Kirrin Medcalf’s complaint was the “occasion” for it happening (and so could be regarded as causing it in a “but for” sense), and although there was a nexus between Ms Bailey’s views and the making of the complaint, it would not be reasonable to hold Stonewall liable for that discriminatory outcome.” The blame, ruled the EAT, was squarely with Garden Court Chambers for choosing to respond to the complaint in a discriminatory way. 

The application of a two-stage test to s.111(2) is an interesting one. It is very unclear as to whether this was actually argued by either party. It also seems at first blush that it may impose a more strenuous threshold than that set out in the plain words of the statute. However, it does undeniably bring the intention / effect into alignment with s.111(1) and s.111(3) and to that extent is an elegant solution. 

This is the first time that the courts have grappled with the definitions of s.111 and as an EAT judgment, this is binding until and unless overturned on appeal, or overruled by a higher court. 

Finally, a note which may sound into future cases. Paragraph 101 of the judgment provides that 

“section 111(1) requires that person A must not “instruct” person B to do in relation to person C anything which contravenes the relevant provisions. I agree with Mr Cooper that the question of person A’s mental state is subsumed into the nature of the prohibited act. It is in the nature of an instruction that the instructor intends the instructee to do something specific. Person A need not be aware that the instructed act will be unlawful, but they must know what it is that they are instructing person B to do, and that act, as instructed, must contain all the elements of whichever of the statutory torts that person B will commit by following the instruction. So if, for example, the statutory tort is direct discrimination, then person A must instruct person B not merely to treat person C less favourably than he treats or would treat others, but must instruct person C to do so because of a protected characteristic. If, on the other hand, the statutory tort is indirect discrimination, then person A must simply instruct person B to apply a PCP which contravenes section 19. Since person B can be liable without knowing or intending that the PCP has that effect, so can person A.”

Put simply, the only intention of the person instructing need be that the person instructed carry out the instruction. If one body instructs another to implement policies that are indirectly discriminatory, the instructing body may be held liable.

This is likely not the last we have seen of s.111.

Legal Feminist Response To Financial Conduct Authority’s Consultation on “Diversity and Inclusion Financial Sector Working Together Drive Change”


Introduction

Legal Feminist is a collective of practising solicitors and barristers who are interested in feminist analysis of law, and legal analysis of feminism. Between us we have a wide range of specialist areas of law including in particular financial services, discrimination and data protection, as well as corporate governance, company law, corporate finance, criminal law, human rights law and public and administrative law. Our range of specialisms enables us to consider holistically the issues raised in the Consultation Paper (CP) and our collective experience enables us to comment on the practical implications of some of those issues.  As a non-aligned collective of lawyers from a range of backgrounds, we do not represent any particular firm or issuer and are therefore well-placed to give candid feedback on the issues raised by the CP.

Executive summary

For reference to consultation document see https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/consultation-papers/cp23-20-diversity-inclusion-financial-sector-working-together-drive-change

As feminists, we welcome initiatives aimed at promoting diversity and inclusion (D&I) and we thank the FCA for its efforts to drive forward D&I initiatives. We particularly support the concept of evidence based strategies. However, the FCA’s proposals engage a range of legal issues and therefore need to be carefully considered by specialists to avoid unintended harm.  Our more detailed responses to questions are set out later in this response, but in summary:

  • The definitions of discriminatory practices and demographic characteristics are ambiguous and will cause confusion and so not meet the FCA’s objectives. We recommend the FCA adopt the definitions of discrimination and harassment applied in the Equality Act and the definition of bullying applied by ACAS, since these are all well understood and supported by a developed body of case law. The term demographic characteristics should be replaced with “protected characteristics” (with the possible addition of socio economic status) and should be defined by reference to the Equality Act.

  • Subject to our comments on the definitions, we support the proposals in respect of non-financial misconduct relating to colleagues and those relating to misconduct outside the workplace.
  • With regard to data collection, reporting and targets:
  • The sector has not yet done enough to tackle the cultural issues faced by women and the barriers which lead to women leaving the sector and which hold back their progression to senior roles. Firms need to better leverage data to analyse these issues, develop strategies to address them and measure progress.  
  • We support the setting of aspirational targets and reporting against them, as a means of holding firms to account publicly. We note the progress made in respect of women and ethnic minority membership of boards as a result of board level initiatives and support the greater extension of this to senior leadership. 
  • More should be done to address the impact of pregnancy, maternity leave and caring responsibilities on women’s careers. Firms should therefore track outcomes for women following pregnancy and maternity leave – for example through exit and promotion data, and develop specific strategies to tackle the issues and improve outcomes.
  • That said, lack of promotion cannot be solely blamed on pregnancy and family responsibilities.  Firms should also focus attention on systemic biases that persist regardless of family responsibility including by analysing data on evaluations, progression, allocation of opportunities and exit data.

  • Collection of data on sex (rather than gender) should be mandatory to reflect the protected characteristic in the Equality Act and so minimise data protection issues. This will better facilitate use of the positive action provisions of the Equality Act and therefore enhance achievement of the FCA’s objectives. It will also align with the mandatory disclosure regime for listed companies under the Companies Act. 

  • Allowing organisations to choose to report on gender instead of sex constitutes indirect discrimination since it places those with gender critical beliefs at a particular disadvantage and is not objectively justified.  As such, the FCA would be inducing a breach of the Equality Act.  We have suggested a more proportionate approach in our comments below.

  • Allowing organisations to choose between sex and gender will also lead to inconsistency and poor quality data. Encouraging collection of data on gender is therefore inconsistent with the FCA’s Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) set out in the Equality Act 2010.

We have answered questions 4, 5, 7 8 and 10 to 17 of the CP below.

Q4: To what extent do you agree with our definitions of the terms specified? 

We disagree with the definition of discriminatory practices.

In order to achieve the FCA’s objectives, it is essential that key definitions are clearly defined in order to ensure transparency, consistency and fairness of application. Since discrimination and harassment can be unintentional and under the proposals there are potential career ending consequences if an individual is found responsible for discriminatory practices, ambiguity must be avoided. 

The definition of the term “Discriminatory Practices” includes discrimination,  harassment or victimisation due to “demographic characteristics”.  However “demographic characteristics” is not defined and it is unclear what is meant by this phrase. In particular, it is unclear whether it includes all the protected characteristics in the Equality Act such as religion and belief, marriage and civil partnership, and what additional characteristics are included.

Our recommendation is that:

  • Either the term demographic characteristics is replaced with “protected characteristics” by reference to the Equality Act; or
  • If the intention is to include socio economic status, to define demographic characteristic as meaning “a protected characteristic pursuant to the Equality Act or socio economic status”. 

Q5: To what extent do you agree with our proposals to expand the coverage of non-financial misconduct in FIT, COCON and COND?

We disagree with the proposed language in FIT and COCON including the proposed definition of harassment.

We agree that non-financial misconduct should be addressed in FIT COCON and COND and recognise the need for the FCA to effectively reverse the outcome in the Frensham. However we have concerns with regard to the scope of the proposed extension:

With regard to conduct outside of work:

  • We agree that dishonesty outside of work is always likely to be relevant to the fit and proper assessment.
  • However, we have material concerns about the proposal to include conduct outside of work that does not involve “a breach of standards that are equivalent to those required under the regulatory system“. In particular, the amendments suggest that a person may be determined to lack “moral soundness, rectitude and steady adherence to an ethical code” as a result of conduct that is “disgraceful or morally reprehensible or otherwise sufficiently serious”.  Terms such as “disgraceful” and “morally reprehensible” introduce a significant degree of ambiguity. Firms are therefore likely to find it more difficult to determine whether an individual remains fit and proper or what to state in a regulatory reference. This is likely to lead to a lack of consistency which is undesirable.  In that regard we would note that the UK financial services industry operates in and draws its workforce from a multi-cultural environment. Accordingly,  there are likely to be cultural and other differences of view as to what is morally wrong.  The FCA’s objectives can be fully met by limiting non-financial misconduct committed outside of work to situations where the conduct is reasonably judged by the employer to amount to a criminal offence (whether or not the individual is charged or convicted). 
  • With regard to conduct towards colleagues:
  • The proposed definition of harassment goes beyond that in the Equality Act, is ambiguous, and will lead to a lack of consistency in determining whether workplace conduct amounts to a breach of the Conduct Rules.  The proposed definition starts with the same language as that of the Equality Act, but goes on to cover conduct that “is unreasonable and oppressive” or “humiliates, degrades or injures” the other person. The reference to “unreasonable” conduct creates unnecessary ambiguity. This risks creating uncertainty for firms seeking to apply the definition. This is unacceptable given that a finding of harassment could end an individual’s career. The ambiguity will also lead to inconsistency between firms. We recommend that the COCON amendment adopt the Equality Act definition of harassment alone. This is a longstanding, well understood definition, with a well-established body of caselaw to assist in its interpretation. 
  • The Conduct Rules should also incorporate an important safeguard to interpretation in the Equality Act currently omitted from the proposed COCON amendment. Under the Equality Act harassment is unlawful if it has the proscribed effect (ie if the act in question creates a hostile etc environment) even if that effect was unintentional. However the Equality Act goes on to state that when considering if the actions have that effect, account should be taken of the other person’s perception, the circumstances, and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. This ensures a level of objectivity in the assessment. While we also welcome the list of general factors for assessing misconduct in relation to colleagues set out in the draft COCON 1.3 , (such as whether the conduct is repeated, its duration, degree of impact and likelihood of damage to culture, the relative seniority of those involved and whether the conduct would justify dismissal), we recommend adopting the additional language from the Equality Act in addition to the proposed general factors.
  • It is our view that conduct toward colleagues should not be regarded as misconduct unless the employer reasonably considers that it amounts to harassment or victimisation within the meaning of the Equality Act and in respect of the characteristics protected by the Equality Act, or harassment within the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act, or bullying within the definition provided by ACAS, or commission of a criminal offence.  

With regard to the threshold Conditions, we note our concerns stated above regarding the definition of Discriminatory Practices. 

 Q7: To what extent do you agree with our proposals on D&I strategies? 

We agree with the FCA’s proposal that firms should be required to develop evidence based strategies.

The sector needs to do more to tackle the cultural issues faced by women, the deconstruct the barriers that prevent women rising to the most senior levels, and to retain women in the sector. Firms need to better leverage data to analyse these issues, develop strategies to address them and measure progress.  In this regard we note:

  • Women typically are more likely than men to take time out of their careers for children, and to bear an unequal share of the burden of childcare. The sector has not done enough to understand and address the impact of pregnancy, maternity leave and caring responsibilities on women’s careers. Firms should therefore expressly track outcomes for women following pregnancy and maternity leave, and develop specific strategies to tackle the issues and improve outcomes, for example to address allocation of career developing opportunities. 

  • However pregnancy and maternity leave are not the sole reasons for the lack of women in senior positions. Firms should also focus attention on systemic biases that have led to this.

  • Some firms have tried to address under-representation of certain groups including women and ethnic minorities through a range of initiatives such as training, policies and mentoring programmes. While these programmes can have positive benefits, they have not to date led to sufficient progress. They are often fragmented, and do not tackle the fundamental structural and cultural issues that persist.  At a time when DE&I resource and funding is under material pressure, we welcome an evidence based approach that focuses on the issues facing women and other underrepresented groups, and which looks at why existing initiatives have not worked.

  • We consider that firms need to investigate and understand what is happening in their organisations, at every point in the employee life cycle, in order to identify where the true challenges are, and develop a strategy to address these challenges. This would involve examining  data not just on recruitment, but at every stage of decision making from intake to annual evaluation, pay and bonus, promotion, allocation of work and opportunities and through to leaver data. For example:

    • Is there evidence that women are less likely to achieve the highest ratings in evaluations? Does this indicate systemic bias in the performance appraisal system?Whether there is bias in the firm’s system for allocation of developmental projects, client relationships and opportunities that are more likely to lead to promotion and higher bonus awards. 

    • Firms should then use this data to build their strategy to tackle inequality in allocation of work and opportunities, bias in the assessment of women and ethnic minorities, lack of transparency in promotion processes, lack of pay transparency, presenteeism and lack of recognition for the differing levels of contribution made by women and men to positive workplace behaviours. 

Q8: To what extent do you agree with our proposals on targets? 

We partially agree with these proposals. 

We support the setting of aspirational targets and reporting against them, as a means of holding firms to account publicly. We note the progress made in respect of listed company boards as a result of initiatives to set targets for representation of women and ethnic minorities and support the greater extension of this to senior leadership.

However we qualify our response noting that:

  • Firms should limit themselves to targets in respect of the main protected characteristics which are measurably under represented compared to the general population. These are likely in most organisations to be sex, ethnicity and disability. In addition, we support targets based on socio economic status. 

  • As noted below in response to question 10, data and targets should refer to sex not gender.

  • Targets should be set by reference to context including the population from which the firm recruits.

  • The FCA should state clearly how socio economic status is to be defined in the context of targets and reporting.

  • Targets should remain aspirational. The recent highly publicised investigation into discrimination in recruitment at the RAF demonstrates the risk where targets are treated as akin to quotas and where inappropriate pressure is placed on individuals to meet them.

Q10: To what extent do you agree with the list of demographic characteristics we propose to include in our regulatory return? 

We disagree with the proposal to make collection of sex data optional and to make maternity data optional. 

  • Sex is the relevant protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. Collection of data on sex should be mandatory. Gender is not a protected characteristic and does not have a recognised meaning. The conflation of sex and gender diminishes the value of the data, and has the effect of introducing self-identification of gender.  This will hamper achievement of the FCA’s objectives, since one of  the main reasons for lack of advancement of women is structural sexism. If data on sex is not collected, structural sexism cannot be measured and addressed. 
  • In providing firms with the option of reporting on the basis of gender in place of sex, the FCA is itself inducing discrimination against those with gender critical beliefs:
  • Indirect discrimination occurs where a practice puts an individual and those who share their protected characteristic at a “particular disadvantage” unless this can be objectively justified. 
  • The gender critical belief (that sex is biological and immutable, and that gender is a concept based on the imposition of stereotypes on each sex) is a protected characteristic. 
  • If employers elect to collect data, set targets and strategy and report on gender rather than sex, those with gender critical beliefs will be placed in an invidious position: their alternatives will be to state something they do not believe in, ie their gender, which is unacceptable to them, not to respond at all, or to select “prefer not to say”.  
  • As such, they are deprived of the opportunity to have their most fundamental characteristic recorded. This places them at a particular disadvantage. Caselaw has made clear that the threshold for establishment of particular disadvantage is not in fact high.  A decision to collect data on gender not sex exceeds this threshold by some considerable margin.  It is more than reasonable for those with gender critical beliefs to wish to have their sex accurately recorded, not to record a gender which they don’t believe exists, and not to be placed in the invidious position where because they cannot respond to the term gender, and are not offered the chance to state their sex, meaning that one of their most fundamental protected characteristics is not recorded.
  • Such a requirement cannot be objectively justified.  While the aim may be to accommodate those trans-identifying colleagues who wish to record their gender, the replacement of sex with gender is not a proportionate way of achieving that aim.  It is deeply offensive to those with gender critical beliefs, and particularly to women. It clearly cannot under any circumstances be appropriate to entirely erase one protected characteristic – sex – in the interests of accommodating.  The more proportionate approach would be to collect data based on sex recorded at birth, combined with a supplementary optional question as to whether the individual considers they have a gender identity that differs from their sex recorded at birth.  This would also have the benefit of ensuring that the employer had accurate data on both issues.  
  • Accordingly, any requirement on or by firms to ask individuals to identify their “gender” is therefore discriminatory.  
  • We also envisage that many of those holding orthodox religious views would similarly disbelieve in innate gender overwriting sex and so would similarly be subject to discrimination.
  • Encouraging discrimination is inconsistent with the PSED.  
  • Following a legal challenge to the ONS, the UK Census collects data on sex. This approach has been followed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA).  The SRA’s approach is to collect data on sex, with three options: male, female and prefer not to say. This is followed by a question to accommodate those hold the belief that they have a gender identity (by asking if they consider they have a gender identity different to their sex as registered at birth). This approach enables accurate collection of data on sex and would better achieve the FCA’s objective.
  • As part of their diversity strategies, firms should be encouraged to use the positive action provisions in sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act. Section 158 for example, facilitates initiatives such as sponsorship and mentoring programmes, diverse interview panels, diverse long lists, specialist open days and outreach programmes etc.  Section 159 enables a decision to appoint an individual from an underrepresented group if certain stringent conditions are met.  As Government and EHRC guidance makes clear, reliance on these provisions is dependent on having data. Accordingly, the ability to apply these provisions in respect of initiatives focused on women is dependent on having good quality data in respect of the protected characteristic of sex.  Data based on “gender” would not meet this requirement.
  • Under GDPR there is a clear legal basis for collecting data on sex, whereas that is not the case for “gender” which is arguably special category data.  
  • The FCA is subject to the PSED under the Equality Act meaning that it must have ‘due regard’ to the need to: 
  • eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under [the EqA]
  • advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not share it and, 
  • foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not share it. 
  • Application of the PSED must be related to the protected characteristics in the Equality Act. Mandatory collection of data on sex would ensure that regulators are able to comply with the PSED:
  • Policy making that seeks to conflate two protected characteristics (sex and gender reassignment) or introduce the concept of gender, which is not a protected characteristic, would fail to advance equality of opportunity between those who share one of those protected characteristics and those that do not.  It would therefore be a breach of the FCA’s duties under the PSED to implement proposals to replace sex with gender, or treat sex as not mandatory.
  • In this regard we note that the Government has abandoned the use of the term “BAME” because (a) aggregation of data for different ethnic groups masks differences in outcome, and (b) because of the offence caused to groups who found themselves grouped together notwithstanding their very different experiences. By analogy, use of the term gender will aggregate the women and those born male who identify as trans, notwithstanding that they will have different experiences, particularly those who identify after their careers have been established. It has also been established that men and women have different risk taking behaviours.   It is very likely that from a risk perspective, the risk taking behaviour of those born male is more likely to align with their birth sex. Further, and as noted above, aggregation is offensive to those with gender critical beliefs.
  • We also consider that firms should collect data on pregnancy and maternity.  Pregnancy and maternity are major contributors to women leaving the sector, to the reduction in opportunities, and lack of promotion to more senior roles. The impact of pregnancy on women’s careers is far greater than the impact that becoming a parent or taking paternity leave has on fathers. In fact there is some evidence that men’s careers take off after fatherhood.  While pregnancy and  maternity leave are for a limited time period, firms could still measure and track progress for women on return from maternity leave – for example how long do they stay, are they overrepresented in redundancy exits, are they under-represented on promotion, and what is the impact on bonus. While the data sets may be relatively small, data protection concerns could be addressed by requiring firms to collect and report such data to the FCA,  but not publish it. 
  • We reject the suggestion that data on parental responsibilities is a more suitable long-term metric than pregnancy and maternity data. There is clear evidence that motherhood has a detrimental impact on women’s careers, and that parental responsibility does not affect men’s careers in the same way. Our view is that firms should collect and report data on pregnancy and maternity, and that data on parental responsibilities should be sub divided by sex.   

Q11: To what extent do you agree that reporting should be mandatory for some demographic characteristics and voluntary for others? 

We agree that in principle reporting of some characteristics should be mandatory and others voluntary:

  • We consider that the mandatory requirements should be limited to key demographic characteristics.  
  • Reporting on parental responsibility should be subdivided by sex, reflecting that typically the impact of parental responsibility on careers differs between men and women. Indeed there is some evidence not only that women’s careers are harmed by having children, the career and pay prospects of men improve.

Q12: Do you think reporting should instead be mandatory for all demographic characteristics? 

No. We consider that reporting (and resources) should focus on key characteristics, including sex, ethnicity and disability. 

Q13: To what extent do you agree with the list of inclusion questions we propose to include in our regulatory return? 

We agree save that the reference to feeling insulted or badly treated because of personal characteristics should be restricted to protected characteristics.

Q14: To what extent do you agree with our proposals on disclosure? 

We agree save that disclosure should relate to sex, not gender.

Q15: To what extent do you agree that disclosure should be mandatory for some demographic characteristics and voluntary for others?

Disclosure of data in respect of sex, ethnicity and disability should be mandatory since these groups are clearly under-represented in comparison to the UK population,

Q16: Do you think disclosure should instead be mandatory for all demographic characteristics? 

No – see our response to question 15. The experience of Legal Feminist is that reporting on multiple characteristics is likely to lead to a diversion of resources away from the key priority areas, as firms would need to spend time and resource on a campaign to build up reporting of data. 

Q17: To what extent do you agree that a lack of D&I should be treated as a non-financial risk and addressed accordingly through a firm’s governance structures? 

We agree.

Edinburgh University, freedom of speech and the heckler’s veto

Edinburgh University has for a second time allowed protestors to prevent the screening of the documentary film “Adult Human Female.” It was initially to be screened in December 2022, but cancelled when demonstrators occupied the university buildings. The rescheduled showing was arranged for 26 April 2023, but prevented once more by a large group of protestors. 

Protestors blocked off the entrances and physically stopped anyone from getting inside. The event was once again cancelled.

The protestors of course regard this as a victory for the prevention of intolerance. A spokesman told the Times that 

“Their argument is that trans women are the problem and are men in disguise and that is a lie. It is tarring a whole community and demonising them. Free speech is fine for everybody but it does not extend to the intolerant and hateful.”

There is nothing in this quote to suggest that the spokesman had in fact watched the film. But what is more remarkable is the spokesman’s claim that free speech “does not extend to the intolerant or hateful.”  

As we have said before, the relevant provision is Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as given effect in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 10 protects freedom of expression, but not unfettered freedom of expression – the old chestnut that there is no freedom to shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre. It is one of the most detailed Articles and reads as follows: 

  1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
  1. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

In the first three paragraphs of his judgment in R (Miller) v College of Policing & CC Humberside [2020] EWHC 225 (Admin), Julian Knowles J summarised three famous citations on free speech: 

  1. In his unpublished introduction to Animal Farm (1945) George Orwell wrote: “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.” 
  2. In R v Central Independent Television plc [1994] Fam 192, 202-203, Hoffmann LJ said that: “… a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be responsible or in the public interest is no freedom. Freedom means the right to publish things which government and judges, however well motivated, think should not be published. It means the right to say things which ‘right-thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible. This freedom is subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by common law or statute.”
  3. Also much quoted are the words of Sedley LJ in Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions (1999) 7 BHRC 375, [20]:
    “Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative … Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having  … “

That of course does not mean that freedom of speech is unlimited. It may be limited where a legitimate aim is pursued, although as was said in R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127,

The existence of a broad legitimate aim is a mere threshold to the key decision in this case, as in almost all cases it must be. Such a legitimate aim must have limits. It cannot extend too far. In our view it cannot extend to preclude legitimate expression of views simply because many might disagree with those views: that would indeed legitimise what in the United States has been described as a “heckler’s veto”.  

This is particularly so when the speech in question, here the film Adult Human Female, is itself an expression of protected views. 

Proportionality is key to any decision to limit free speech. In Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 the European Court of Human Rights said at [49]:

“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. This means, amongst other things, that every ‘formality’, ‘condition’, ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”

There are two issues here, in terms of freedom of expression (I am not considering here the law on academic freedom, but only human rights. For those wanting further reading around academic freedom, the law in England and Wales can be found here and Scottish law here.) 

The first is whether the film Adult Human Female really is as offensive as the protestors claim. That in my view is inconceivable – it discusses proposed changes to the law from the perspective of one of the affected groups, namely women. 

The second is that even if a sector of the population disagrees with it, feels personally affected or is offended by it, this intimidation is disproportionate and anti-democratic. A protest that does not prevent the event from taking place must be possible. 

It is noteworthy that one of the groups who are highlighted as anti-democratic in the film are UCU. A number of the academic interviewees express disbelief that a union for those whose lives are dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge should behave in such an anti-intellectual way. I do wonder whether UCU’s enthusiastic support for the protests in Edinburgh is to spare its own blushes should their students watch the film and find out how spineless their tutors are when faced with intellectual disagreement. 

Freedom of expression is valuable. If the protestors’ freedom of expression were similarly impaired by mob justice, they would be outraged. They should be careful what they wish for. 

Red tape or essential protection? Third party harassment revisited.

The Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Bill currently proceeding through Parliament and predicted to become law in 2024, raises some subtle questions about the relationship between protection from harassment and freedom of speech. 

When the Equality Act 2010 was passed, it included provisions outlawing third party harassment and  providing a legal claim against an employer by an employee who suffered harassment by a third party such as a customer, client or visitor.

These provisions were criticised at the time as unduly complex, in particular, for the fact that they required the employee to have suffered two previous incidents of harassment at work. The provisions were rarely used. But rather than amend the law to something that actually worked well, the government threw out the baby with the bath water, and entirely repealed the provisions under section 65 of  the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 as part of its “Red Tape Challenge”.

There remained some scope to bring a claim for third-party harassment under section 26 of the  Equality Act on the basis that an employer’s failure to prevent harassment by a third party is itself harassment. But  

in Unite the Union v Nailard [2018] EWCA Civ 103 the Court of Appeal held that to succeed in a claim of this kind, the claimant must prove that the employer has a discriminatory motive for failing to take action.That will rarely be possible. As a result, employees were left relatively unprotected in this situation.

A few years after the Red Tape Challenge, the #MeToo movement brought workplace harassment into sharp focus, including harassment by clients and customers to workers . This included undercover reporting by the Financial Times of  a notorious charity fundraising event at the now closed Presidents Club in 2018 , where the hostesses were reportedly groped and sexually harassed by rich and powerful men.

In 2018, after a call for evidence, the EHRC published a report called “Turning the tables: Ending sexual harassment at work”. The report found that third-party harassment is a particular problem for people in customer-facing roles, with around a quarter of those reporting harassment saying that the perpetrators were third parties. They also found that third-party sexual harassment was dealt with poorly and was viewed by some employers as a ‘normal’ part of the job. 

It recommended amongst other steps that:

·      the UK Government should introduce a mandatory duty on employers to take reasonable steps to protect workers from harassment and victimisation in the workplace.

·      Breach of the mandatory duty should constitute an unlawful act for the purposes of the Equality Act 2006, which would be enforceable by the Commission. 

The Government announced it supported the recommendations, and  backed a Private Members’ bill. 

Under the new law, when it comes into force (likely to be in 2024),  

an employer will be liable if a third party harasses an employee in the course of his or her employment and the employer has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent them from doing so. The provision is not limited to sexual harassment and so covers the other relevant protected characteristics as well. 

A new duty will also require an employer to take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of their employees in the course of their employment. Breach of the duty will be an unlawful act, enforceable by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. There will be a Code of Practice setting out what reasonable steps should be taken.

Although employees will not be able to bring standalone claims specifically for breach of the duty to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment, if an employee is successful in a claim for sexual harassment and the employment tribunal rules that the employer is in breach of the duty, it will have the power to award an uplift in compensation not exceeding 25%. 

These are largely positive developments which should reinforce the obligations on employers to protect their employees and plug an important gap where employees are at risk of third party harassment. 

However concerns have been raised about the scope of the provisions in the context of free speech.

The Government has proposed an amendment to the Bill so that employers will not be liable for workplace harassment (other than sexual harassment) in circumstances where that harassment arises as a result of a ‘protected conversation’: one which involves the expression of opinion on a political, social, moral or religious matter, in which an individual is not a participant. In effect, this intends to exclude overheard conversations where a personal view is expressed. This amendment has been proposed with a view to addressing concerns about how the Bill, as previously drafted, might curtail the legitimate expression of free speech.

Despite this proposed amendment, the solicitor James Murray of Mishcon de Reya, a specialist in law related to Higher Education and academic freedom has raised concerns whether the change in law  will still negatively affect academic freedom on campus, with officials using the excuse of the third party liability to disallow controversial academic speakers on campus

Obviously, this Bill is not yet law, and there may be further amendments. But the lesson from the Red Tape Challenge is one that this Government (currently engaged in potential mass repeal of EU legislation via the Retained Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill 2022 (also proceeding currently through Parliament) would be wise to learn. 

Is this or any law red tape or essential protection? I welcome this long overdue protection from third party harassment but great care needed to ensure the right balance to protect free speech.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Guest Blog by Cyclefree, a lawyer/investigator specialising in financial services and whistleblowing investigations.

A thought experiment

Take a religious group – something like Opus Dei, for instance. What might it do if determined enough? Let’s imagine. 

  • It successfully presents itself as the only valid representative of all Catholics, indeed, all Christians in the UK – at least as far as the press and politicians are concerned. 
  • It attracts support from popular celebrities. 
  • It speaks regularly about discrimination against Catholics, how marginalised a minority and about their human rights (“Catholic rights are human rights”). 
  • It says anyone raising concerns about child abuse by Catholic clergy shows hatred. 
  • It describes those who criticize it or Catholics generally as “heretics” and “hate groups” or phobic.
  • It runs schemes whereby, for money, it audits organizations for how pro-Catholic – as determined by Opus Dei – they are. 
  • It advises organizations and trains their employees on language, facilities, policies, the steps they must take – both internally and externally – to promote the faith as promulgated by Opus Dei and earn those points. 
  • It requires organizations to teach all its staff (not simply Catholic ones) to talk about their souls, use religious language in their communications and remove any language or expressions which might offend Catholics. 
  • It publishes league tables identifying which organizations are the most pro-Catholic, as decided by it. 
  • It campaigns for changes in legislation to promote its religious ideals, changes which significantly alter existing equality legislation, especially for those opposed to religion having a say in legislation or affected by the changes it lobbies for. 
  • It lobbies for the abolition of civil and same sex marriage so that marriage will be  based on Opus Dei’s understanding of the Sacraments. 
  • It advises organizations on equality law based on what it would like the law to be.
  • It provides training and information packs to be used by schools. 
  • It has a flag, special days to celebrate what it stands for and regular public events at which employees from its members dress up in its religious habits and use its symbols, on vehicles, buildings and elsewhere. 

Finally, imagine that many of the organizations where Opus Dei do this are state or state-funded organizations – the police, local authorities, government departments, grant-giving bodies and health authorities. They sign up to its creed, use its language, promote its symbols and congratulate themselves not just on not being anti-Catholic but on being proudly pro-Catholic, pro-Opus Dei. 

Reasons for worry?

You’d think, wouldn’t you, that this is a bit odd. You’d be concerned at how a particular ideology was being spread without anyone else having a say. You’d be concerned that this seems to put the rights, interests and views of one group above those of others. You’d worry that it appears to be distorting or misinterpreting equality legislation. You might even wonder at the number of law firms signing up, thinking they’d be well placed to understand the law without the need to rely on non-legal lobbyists. You’d worry that the normal space for disagreement about aims and means was being squeezed out if any disagreement or challenge or questioning was described as “hate” and those expressing such concerns as “hate groups”. Above all, you’d worry that this creates a conflict of interest between what such organizations are legally required to do for all citizens and what they have agreed to do to satisfy Opus Dei and maintain their position in its league tables. 

You don’t, of course, need to imagine any of this because it is happening now. Substitute Stonewall for Opus Dei and it pretty much describes how Stonewall currently operates. 

The consequences

Those state organizations which sign up to Stonewall’s schemes have created multiple conflicts of interest: between themselves as employers and different groups of employees and between their public duties and their legal obligations to all citizens. They have blurred the distinction between a body carrying out public functions under existing laws and campaigning lobbyists. They have failed to recognise that such conflicts of interest exist. They have failed to consider the creation of a perception of such conflicts of interest, even if that was not their intention. They appear not to understand the problems arising when a body implementing the law acts as if changes desired by a lobby group advising it had already happened. Since they have not understood any of this, they have taken no steps to eliminate or mitigate such conflicts of interest. 

This is why we get the usual cycle of some unacceptable action or comment, protest, panic by the organization concerned, withdrawal of the original comment/action accompanied by an apology blaming it all on an underling/a mistake and assurance that whatever happened was not in line with their “values”. The fundamental underlying problem and how to address it seems to pass them by entirely.

The police

Nowhere is the existence of such conflicts of interest more troubling than in the police. The police enforce the criminal law. They have significant powers over us. They have a duty to police “without fear or favour”. They need not just do this but be seen to do this. The reality of bias, the perception of a bias are damaging to proper policing. Such conflicts of interest risk damaging the rule of law and citizens’ faith in it. 

This has been made more acute by three factors: 

(1) Police misunderstanding their obligations as employers under equalities legislation.

(2) Confusing their obligations as an employer with their outward-facing public service obligations.

(3) The police’s approach to non-crime hate incidents. 

Equalities laws and discrimination

Discrimination against police officers from minorities has understandably led to counter-measures. But what the police appear to have forgotten is that the obligation not to discriminate applies to all its staff. It does not simply apply to one group with a strong lobby behind it. In following the diktats of one lobby group, the police risk behaving in a way which discriminates, whether directly or indirectly, against others. For an excellent, detailed explanation of why – and the risks involved -, see Naomi Cunningham’s blog – https://wwww.legalfeminist.org.uk/2021/02/01/submission-and-compliance/.

Public duties

This approach has extended to its public-facing duties, as a direct result of the reach of Stonewall’s schemes. The training of staff according to Stonewall’s views will inevitably affect how they carry out their duties towards the public. More explicitly, Stonewall’s schemes expressly cover “service users”. For public bodies, this means us. It is astonishing and worrying that any public body – let alone the police – should think it appropriate to allow a lobby group to dictate, influence or advise on the performance of its public functions. The police’s sole purpose is to enforce the criminal law. When it needs advice, it should obtain this from expert criminal lawyers. If it needs advice on complying with equality law, it should obtain this from expert equality lawyers. What it should not do is obtain advice or training from – or be influenced by – a lobby group primarily acting for only one of the groups it polices. What is even more worrying is that in all the time the police have been part of Stonewall’s schemes, it appears not to have obtained legal advice on whether doing so creates a conflict of interest or the perception of one and whether, if so, this creates a risk in how it carries out its public duties.

Non-crime “hate”

The final point relates to the police’s approach to non-crime hate incidents. One might ask why the police are involved at all in matters which are not crimes. Whatever the reason, they have got themselves involved in what Lord Moulton described some 90 years ago as the “realm of manners” – that space between the law at one end and free choice at the other. 

They have allied themselves closely with one lobby group and adopted its view on matters where there are both differences of opinion, a changing scientific context and legislation and case law different to what the lobby group believes or wants. In so doing, the police have put themselves in a position where those who disagree with Stonewall’s position can have little 

confidence that in any incident involving such matters the police will be – and be seen as – compliant with the law, not overreaching their powers and impartial. 

This last point was seen in the Miller case where the Court of Appeal held that police guidance to record non-crime hate incidents –

“is plainly an interference with freedom of expression and knowledge that such matters are being recorded and stored in a police database is likely to have a serious ‘chilling effect’ on public debate”. 

A year later, the College of Policing is proposing (apparently on legal advice) guidance allowing transgender officers to search those of the opposite sex to that of the transgender officer. This appears to be a breach of the relevant PACE provisions. It is, however, consistent with Stonewall’s view that a man who believes he is a woman is one and so should be allowed to carry out an intimate search of a woman. According to reports, the guidance also appears to suggest that a refusal by a woman or request for a female officer could be classed as a hate crime. The underlying assumption appears to be that intimate searches of the public are a service which, say, women should not deny to trans-identified male officers. This is a topsy turvy approach to police compliance with a law, one brought in after miscarriages of justice and police misbehaviour to ensure that evidence is properly collected without a sexual assault being committed and with proper regard for the dignity of the person being searched who is, it should be remembered, innocent. 

We’ve been here before

The police being beholden to groups with an agenda is not a new problem. In Northern Ireland ever since its establishment, the RUC was seen as the explicitly anti-Catholic enforcement arm of a “Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people”. The bias was real and ultimately fatal to the rule of law there. More recently, the issue of Freemasonry raised similar concerns. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, concerns about corruption in police forces arose because of a perception that Masonic officers were putting the interests of fellow Masons above those of the force as a whole or their obligation to obey the law. Membership of a secret organization was eventually seen as creating a conflict of interest between a police officer’s duties and his obligations as a Mason. There is an echo of this in the way that Stonewall’s agreements with members of its schemes are not made public on the grounds of commercial confidentiality, despite the obligations they place on public servants.

Now

This time it is not whether individual officers may have a conflict of interest. Rather it is that police forces – by making themselves beholden to Stonewall’s agenda through its schemes – are explicitly putting themselves in a position where one cannot be confident that police decisions aren’t distorted by their membership of those schemes. For instance, how can women arguing for single sex spaces facing a demonstration by those demanding they include transwomen have confidence in policing of such a demo by police trained by those arguing the latter and turning up in a car painted in Stonewall colours? How can someone objecting to a potential breach of PACE be confident that they won’t be unfairly charged with a hate crime or have a non-crime hate incident recorded against their name if the police force has signed up to guidance permitting this? 

How can one have confidence that the police – or other public authorities (see, for instance, the latest furore over the withdrawal of an Arts Council grant to a lesbian organisation opposed by Stonewall) – will not, in part (maybe unconsciously), be influenced by their desire to please Stonewall? One can’t. There is a clear conflict of interest. There is certainly a perception of one. The police should never have allowed this to arise. Nor should other public authorities. Or private bodies, for that matter. But at least there we have a choice. We do not with state bodies.

It is long past the time for them to stop outsourcing their thinking to – and seeking to comply with the requirements of – lobby groups. If such bodies won’t act, the government should intervene. Conflicts of interest are the sine qua non of all scandals. This one is no longer even hiding in plain sight.

New clause 15A of the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill: a chocolate fireguard? 

The Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill proposes a raft of amendments to the gender recognition process in Scotland. It sounds dry and technical, and of interest only in Scotland. But the changes proposed by the Bill, including sweeping away the requirement for a medical diagnosis and reducing the minimum age to 16, will be of great legal and practical significance south as well as north of the border. This is because Scottish GRCs will be available to anyone who is resident in Scotland at the time of the application, or whose birth or adoption was registered in Scotland. If it goes through, there will soon be many individuals holding Scottish GRCs – granted on the basis of radically loosened criteria – resident in the rest of the UK. 

Similar changes were mooted by the Westminster Government in its 2018 consultation on GRA reform, but abandoned in light of the responses to that consultation. 

There’s much current debate about what exactly a GRC means for the operation of the Equality Act 2010, and especially for the operation of the single-sex exceptions in the Act. As yet, there are no definite answers provided by binding case-law. It has been widely argued that a GRC allows a biologically male holder easier access to all women-only spaces (toilets; changing rooms; single-sex hospital wards – including locked psychiatric wards where some of the most vulnerable and traumatised women in society are detained; rape crisis centres; prisons etc) subject only to very narrowly construed exceptions. Official guidance on the subject is in a state of flux. A statutory Code of Practice published in 2011 by the EHRC, the UK’s equality law regulator, suggests that a person with a GRC must be treated for the purposes of the exceptions as being of the “acquired sex”, which makes it more difficult to justify exclusion. More recent non-statutory guidance is silent on the impact of a GRC, and the 2011 Code is now under review.

If the Bill in its current form is passed, single-sex spaces and services will come under intense pressure from members of the new, larger group possessing GRCs who feel entitled to automatic access. And public authorities and service-providers may well often be intimidated into allowing that access by the complexity and uncertainty of the potential legal arguments. There is already plentiful evidence that providers are struggling to understand the law here. Both the EHRC and the UN special rapporteur on violence against women and girls have raised grave concerns about the impact of the Bill. 

At Stage 2, Labour’s Pam Duncan-Glancy MSP introduced an amendment that purports to deal with these worries. This was agreed, inserting into the Bill a new clause 15A. Having given evidence to the Scottish Parliament on these subjects earlier this year, I want to supplement that evidence to comment on whether the amendment deals with the concerns above. 

 Clause 15A says: 

“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act modifies the Equality Act 2010.”

This is vacuous. The Bill couldn’t modify the Equality Act if it wanted to, because equal opportunities is a subject that has been explicitly put beyond the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament by the Scotland Act 1998 (schedule 5, part II, paragraph L.2). If an Act of the Scottish Parliament purports to do something beyond the Parliament’s legislative competence, the provisions in question are simply ineffective. 

So this new clause does precisely nothing. 

The problem was not that the Bill (before amendment) modified the Equality Act – it couldn’t do that anyway – but that the Bill makes it much easier to get hold of a certificate that may have profound consequences for the way in which the single-sex exceptions in the Equality Act operate. As another witness to the Scottish Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee suggested, this is best understood by thinking of those provisions of the Equality Act as creating a locked door to which only a few people have the key. The new clause added by Pam Duncan-Glancy’s amendment says: “For the avoidance of doubt, we’re not removing the door, or changing it or its lock in any way.” That’s irrelevant. The door and its lock are safe in Westminster, and the Scottish Parliament couldn’t change them if it tried. What the Bill proposes to do – and at least arguably can do – is manufacture thousands of extra keys to the door, and hand them out to pretty much anyone who says they’d like one. The amendment doesn’t address that. 

That’s not to say that the Bill couldn’t be amended to make explicit that any GRC issued under it has no effect for the purposes of the Equality Act. The EHRC suggested something very like the amendment proposed at Stage 2 by Foysol Choudhury MSP to achieve this, but the Scottish Government rejected it. 

For such an amendment to be fully effective, it would ideally be accompanied by changes to the privacy provisions in Section 22 of the GRA 2004. This section already creates confusion and fear among service-providers. At least one Scottish health authority has stated that it cannot guarantee female healthcare on the grounds of protecting privacy. The Employment Lawyers’ Association analysed the problem at paragraphs 27-30 of its written evidence to the Westminster Parliament of November 2020. 

A petition lodged at Westminster by Sex Matters earlier this month asks the UK Government to modify the Equality Act 2010 to put it beyond doubt that the terms “sex”, “male”, “female”, “man” and “woman” in equality law mean biological sex and not “sex as modified by a Gender Recognition Certificate”. This is something only Westminster can do, but it is a simple and powerful solution that would bring closure to the heated and sometimes toxic debate about what exactly is the impact of a GRC on the operation of the Equality Act. 

This problem can be solved in various ways, but clause 15A isn’t one of them. 
______________________

Naomi Cunningham is a barrister specialising in discrimination law.  She gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament in June 2022: https://www.scottishparliament.tv/meeting/equalities-human-rights-and-civil-justice-committee-june-14-2022; and to the Westminster Equality and Human Rights Committee.  She was a member of the working group that wrote the response of the Employment Lawyers’ Association to the Women and Equalities Committee’s 2020 call for evidence. The commendably non-partisan working group also included Robin Moira White and Nicola Newbegin, authors of a 2021 book, “A Practical Guide To Transgender Law”.

Chesterton’s Fence

Guest Blog by Cyclefree, a lawyer/investigator specialising in financial services and whistleblowing investigations.

“Lessons will be learnt”. How often do we hear this? If only. Lessons are not learnt: not by those who should learn them; not enough to prevent similar problems happening again.

Why?

1.      The memory hole

If a few years ago, who remembers the investigation or report? Or that it might contain something relevant now? Gavin Williamson resigned over bullying allegations against MPs and civil servants. But no commentator mentioned the 2018 Dame Laura Cox report[1] into bullying within Parliament. It was promptly buried with no action taken. So here we are. Again.

2.      This time it’s different

The 4 most dangerous words in the English language. Not true and too often an excuse for ignoring lessons painfully learnt.

3.      Defining the question to get the answer you want

See Credit Suisse in trouble over Archegos[2], a fund run by a man who, when running a different fund, was convicted for insider dealing. How did they get themselves comfortable? Well, by saying this was a different legal entity thus ignoring the character, history of the man in charge and the risks this posed.

4.      La-la-la: I’m not listening. Or asking. Denying evidence, not making inquiries so as to 

avoid getting inconvenient answers, refusing to listen to those raising concerns, retaliating 

against whistleblowers are all too common. Believing what fits with your preconceived

opinions commoner still. As is dismissing concerns as a “moral panic”.

5.      Groupthink: With the latest fashionable cause, it becomes easy to ignore those asking 

difficult questions or challenging the proposals. Easier to go with the flow than be a member

of the awkward squad, especially if retaliation is feared or threatened[3].

Remarkably, the Scottish government has taken all of these routes in its response to those asking questions about the GRR Bill. Consider this by Shona Robison earlier this year –

“There is no evidence that predatory and abusive men have ever had to

pretend to be anything else to carry out abusive and predatory behaviour.”

She went on –

“The evidence is critical in relation to this issue.” 

Indeed. It is. She clarified –

“If we look at the evidence, the threat to women and girls comes from 

predatory and abusive men, not the trans community.”

Note the assumption that not only is there no crossover between predatory, abusive men and those claiming to be trans but there can never be such a crossover.

Still, no evidence? Really? Let’s be kind and accept she was only referring to those countries which had brought in self-ID as planned for Scotland. The Scottish government is always keen to emphasise how in line with international best practice it is. So it must surely have looked at what the evidence actually showed. Yes? Alas, no – as seen in this summary of the international position by MurrayBlackburnMackenzie[4].

It’s worth noting: 

(1)     the Scottish government has admitted that it has not found or done any research on the 

impact of self-ID laws on women in these other countries[5]. Always easiest to claim there is 

no evidence if you don’t bother looking for it, of course.

(2)     In fact, there is evidence of significant problems affecting women, for instance, men ID’ing as women to obtain access to women in places such as prison. In Canada, the US, even Argentina where self-ID was first enacted in 2012.

Let’s look more widely. Is there any evidence in, say, the UK of abusive men pretending to be something else in order to abuse? Or using the cover of something fashionable or respected to carry out abuse? 

–      A celebrity famous for his charitable activities, say? Why, yes: see Jimmy Savile. 

–      Or an inspirational Olympic-winning swimming coach? Yes again – see George Gibney[6], one of many male sports coaches abusing those entrusted to their care. 

–      What about the 19 IICSA Investigation Reports[7] into the multiple ways in which men abused their positions as priests, teachers, social workers, foster carers, sports coaches and so on to harm the vulnerable? An unbearable amount of evidence there.

–      Too long ago, maybe? Well, in the last week the HMICFRS Report[8] into the police has detailed how predatory men have become policemen, using that position to abuse women, girls and children.

–      What about Scotland? How about convicted sex offenders abusing loopholes allowing them to change their identity[9], the essence of the proposed GRR Bill? Yes, this has happened. 

–     Or England? How about someone seeking to dupe a women’s refuge into letting a paedophile who claimed to be transto stay there for 71 days[10]. Again, yes.

But these abusers are not from the trans community, might be the reply. Alas, there is evidence of men claiming to be trans and using that claim to gain access to victims[11]. Or to abuse victims then claim to be trans to avoid or mitigate punishment or gain access to women’s prisons where more victims may be found[12].

What is not yet known – or not with great clarity – is whether those men who are either diagnosed with gender dysphoria or claim to be trans without such a diagnosis have the same rate and type of offending as other men or a higher or lower rate. Getting and understanding such evidence is surely essential before anyone can say that the “trans” community (however defined) poses no risk. Of that, however, there is no sign.

The scale of abuse by male predators is hard to assess. Not all is reported. But that there is overwhelming evidence, accumulated over decades – about how predators operate, how they gravitate to places where victims are found, how they put themselves in positions where it is hard for them to be challenged, how loopholes are abused, opportunities exploited – is undeniable. There is no sector, class, place or profession where it does not happen. There is no group of people immune from being predators. There is no basis for saying that men who are or claim to be trans cannot be – and are not – abusers.

Two facts are clear: overwhelmingly, sexual predators are men; overwhelmingly, their victims are females. The burden is surely on those proposing a reform allowing any man over 16 to change gender purely on his say-so to show why – and how – it will not be abused or exploited by those claiming to be trans.

Two arguments are often used by the reform’s defenders. 

(1)     Equating trans people with predators is unfair and offensive. 

It is no better than those who, opposed to gay rights, claimed that gay men were paedophiles. 

Current concerns are another unjustifiable moral panic. 

A strawman. It is not that trans people are abusers by definition. Of course, they aren’t. Rather, there will be abusers claiming to be trans in order to commit crimes or otherwise gain some advantage. It is they who are being unfair to trans people by using them as cover to exploit the opportunities the reformers will enable[13].

Second, see what IICSA’s final report says: allegations of a moral panic about child abuse allowed a culture of denial of what was happening, giving cover to abusers[14]. There were instances of paedophiles who used councils’ desire to increase “diversity” to get jobs where they could abuse children, jobs they would not have got had there been proper due diligence and a focus on what mattered – safeguarding[15].

The same point was made in last week’s report on the police. The recommendations of previous reports were ignored, the police were largely in denial about the problems, when women officers reported concerns they were not taken seriously, other considerations prevailed and risk assessment was poor. As the Chief Inspector wrote: “The police must be much more sceptical of those who want to wear the uniform.” [16]

(2)     “Ah, but men don’t need to use self-Id to carry out abuse” , say the reform’s defenders. 

After all, these crimes were committed before self-ID is even legally blessed. Well, not quite 

true. But how does that help? If men have already been claiming to be women in order to

commit crimes, avoid punishment or get a lighter regime, why wouldn’t that increase once

self-ID is enshrined in law, with the legal consequences the Scottish government is right now

claiming before the courts?[17] It is not just the police who need to be “much more sceptical”.

This rebuttal misses the point. Of course, predators don’t need self-ID to commit abuse. Sexual predators don’t needto become teachers, priests, sports coaches, entertainers, charity workers or anything else, either. But they do. 

The key questions – those the Scottish government has carefully avoided asking – are:

–        Are there risks that this reform – and how it is enacted – could be abused?

–        How great are those risks? 

–        What are the consequences and for whom, if the risks are realised?

–        Does it prevent or limit challenge, an essential safeguarding requirement?

–        Can the risks be mitigated or eliminated? If so, how?

–        If they can’t, should the reform go ahead at all or in its current form?

Three important lessons from previous reports are these: 

(1)     Boundaries matter – whether physical, safeguarding procedures, vetting, due diligence, 

processes, legal requirements, conditions to be complied with, verifications or, in Matt Parr’s

words, “scepticism” about why someone wants to join a particular group. 

(2)     Ignoring previous reports, recommendations and evidence will make problems much

 worse.

(3)     Scandals happen when those boundaries are abolished, ignored, weakened or seen as

secondary to some more important purpose: “diversity”, for instance, or the reputation of an

institution or group, when challenge is made unacceptable. 

In Chesterton’s words – in their haste to remove the fence, people forget why the fence is needed. 

The final IICSA report says that years ago child abuse was not perhaps as well understood as now. It is not much of an excuse for behaviour which even then was wrong. But it may explain why it was not taken seriously as it should have been. The same can also be said of violence against women. 

There is no such excuse now. It is unconscionable for the Scottish government to ignore evidence, to refuse to listen to women who have suffered abuse[18], to refuse to acknowledge the possibility of risks let alone assess them, to take no steps to mitigate them, not to do the necessary research, to assert what they would like to be true rather than engage and explain. 

If it continues to ignore the lessons of previous scandals and repeat the same mistakes, then the dismal cycle of harm to the vulnerable, scandal, outrage, investigation, report, apology and promises to learn those lessons will inevitably be repeated. This is bad law and even worse governance. Above all, it is an abdication of responsibility those in public office have to citizens, especially the most vulnerable.

[1]  The report can be found here – https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/Conduct-in-Parliament/dame-laura-cox-independent-inquiry-report.pdf

[2]  See https://barry-walsh.co.uk/same-old-same-old/

[3] See the First Minister’s response to the resignation of Ash Regan. And the decision by 8 SNP MSPs not to vote for or abstain on the GRR Bill.

[4] https://murrayblackburnmackenzie.org/2021/09/08/gender-recognition-reform-and-international-developments/

[5]  See https://archive2021.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/28877.aspx?SearchType=Advance&ReferenceNumbers=S5W-26950&ResultsPerPage=10

[6]  https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p08njhrm – this podcast details Gibney’s crimes over decades and their impact on his victims.

[7] The reports can be found here – https://www.iicsa.org.uk

[8] See https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publication-html/an-inspection-of-vetting-misconduct-and-misogyny-in-the-police-service/

[9] See https://www.scottishdailyexpress.co.uk/news/politics/snp-ministers-urged-close-sex-28360507

[10] See https://www.thesun.ie/news/9679107/transgender-paedophile-duped-staff-domestic-violence-refuge/

[11] See https://transcrimeuk.com

[12] See https://www.scottishdailyexpress.co.uk/news/scottish-news/male-prisoners-changing-gender-under-28149343

[13] Chapter 4 of the 2018 Morgan report on Islington Council is illuminating on how abusers seek to piggy-back on more respectable organisations, to the reputational detriment of the latter. See https://www.islington.gov.uk/-/media/sharepoint-lists/public-records/communications/information/adviceandinformation/20182019/20181107sarahmorganqcreviewreport.pdf.

[14] See the Background and Context section of IICSA’s Final Report’s Executive Summary: “The notion that child sexual abuse was ‘not harmful’ persisted into the 1990s and, in some professional spheres, responses to it were seen as ‘over zealous’ and characterised as a ‘moral panic’.” 

[15] See the 1994 White Report (https://islingtonsurvivorsnetwork2.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/the-white-report-redacted.pdf) and the 2018 report by Sarah Morgan QC on Islington Council (footnote 12)

[16] See the Times article by the Chief Inspector of the Police, Matt Parr – https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/matt-parr-trust-is-badly-damaged-but-not-beyond-repair-z09gd56r3

[17] See the current judicial review by ForWomenScotland against the Scottish Government – https://forwomen.scot/18/07/2022/judicial-review-2/

[18] See https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/women-survivors-of-male-violence-brand-msps-refusal-to-hear-them-a-kick-in-the-t/